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 Most workers have one employment contract that is explicit and another one that is 
implicit. The explicit employment contract specifies working hours, compensation, and job tasks. 
The implicit contract involves expectations about the extent to which the employment 
relationship is not just a payment for labor on the spot market but instead is likely to continue 
over time. The possibility of a longer-term commitment between an employer and its employees 
in turn has a number of implications: for example, whether firms will seek to avoid mass layoffs 
unless or until absolutely necessary; whether firms may cushion the wages and compensation of 
employees to some extent from broad swings in the economy; whether employees will show 
some degree of loyalty to the firm; and what kind of investments in human capital the firm will 
be willing to finance. 
 From the standpoint of the economic risks faced by households, one of the single biggest 
concerns is the risk of job loss—and in particular, the risk that employers may be doing less 
recently than they might have done in the past to shield employees from this risk. By its nature, 
the provisions of the implicit employment contract cannot be observed directly. However, it is 
possible to compile a range of evidence bearing on some of the central issues relating to why 
employers decide to trim jobs; why and how firms decide to lay off employees; job tenure and 
the length of time that a worker can expect to remain with an employer; how job loss affects 
workers in terms of subsequent wages and health; and the effects of job loss on short- and long-
run corporate performance. 
 This paper will argue that, along a number of these dimensions, the nature of the worker-
firm employment relationship may have changed substantially in recent years—a group of 
changes that as a whole have negatively affected the lives of workers and produced modest, if 
any, benefits for firms. This erosion of the implicit employment contract suggests that if 
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employers have become less involved with cushioning the blow of unemployment and avoiding 
layoffs where possible, then public policy might have a role to play in spreading the burden of a 
down labor market so that the burden is not borne so heavily by those who lose their jobs 
entirely. 
 
The Employment Contract and Reasons for Layoffs 
 
 The standard labor “spot market” model of the labor market described in textbooks 
assumes that wages are set equal to worker’s marginal products and are constantly updated 
depending on economic conditions. Examples of spot markets can be markets for day laborers or, 
perhaps less so, for temporary help services (Autor, 2001). A different view of the labor market 
is based on “contracts,” whereby the employer may help keep the worker from fluctuations and 
risk in the market (for example, Devereux and Hart, 2005). For examples of this literature, Okun 
(1981) and Bertrand (2004) discuss the “invisible handshake” where an “implicit” contract 
regarding compensation and work is made between the worker and the firm. Devereaux and Hart 
(2005) provide evidence that is consistent with spot labor markets in Britain. Kotlikoff and Wise 
(1985) consider the “spot” versus “contract” views of the U.S. labor market with particular 
emphasis on pensions. They find a large spike in values of pensions to individuals and doubt the 
existence of associated large changes in marginal products, evidence which they argue is 
inconsistent with the spot market model and favors the contract model. 
 To the extent that implicit labor contracts exist, firms may shield workers from economic 
vicissitudes by, for example, not readily laying them off except under extreme duress, and 
perhaps also insulating their wages and benefits at the cost of profits during downturns. (It 
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should be noted that keeping workers on during downturns may also in some cases be nothing 
more than profit-seeking behavior by a firm looking to avoid the substantial hiring and firing 
costs that some firms face.) Some also argue that the employment contract may also include 
reciprocal obligations from workers to firms. Loyalty from workers to firms would be very 
difficult to measure, but would be an interesting subject for (no doubt, interdisciplinary) future 
work. 
 It is often difficult to determine why a worker and a firm separated: Was it the worker’s 
decision, the firm’s decision, or some mixture of both? Job leaving can be voluntary for many 
reasons, including normal retirement, the lure of a better job, a family geographic move that 
necessitates a new job, and others. In addition, while being fired for “cause” is certainly not 
voluntary, it doesn’t seem as if such cases should count as a fraying of the implicit labor 
contract. If we want to investigate a possible decline in employers’ perceived obligations under 
implicit labor contracts, we might want to instead consider the prevalence of layoffs. Of course, 
there is a long list of euphemisms for this kind of job loss including “reductions in force,” 
“adjustment,” “resizing,” “rightsizing,” and “restructuring.” Some of the work in this area uses 
evidence from the Displaced Workers Supplement to the Current Population Survey. According 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008), displaced workers are defined as “persons 20 years of 
age or older who lost or left jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was 
insufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished.” According to the usual 
government definition of this kind of job loss, the lost job must have been held at least three 
years. This minimum job tenure of three-years is interesting in light of the relatively large 
volume of “churning” in the labor market, which I will discuss further below. 
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 Some evidence suggests that the labor market is more fluid than in the past. Average 
tenure of workers is falling and employees seem less “loyal” to particular employers. Further, 
journalistic stories like Tuna (2008) report that “lifetime employment, a hallmark at some 
employers in the US for generations appears to be disappearing.” These stories are backed up by 
academic studies like Cappelli (2005, p. 110), who notes: “For employees, economic downturns 
are now more catastrophic, because more workers are laid off more quickly with less chance of 
being rehired, while those who remain employed find their employment conditions worsening. 
But upturns are now more advantageous, as employers bid not only for entry-level help, as they 
have in the past, but also for experienced workers.” With the U.S. unemployment rate 
approaching 10 percent in the summer of 2009, labor market conditions are worse for the typical 
worker than they have been for a generation. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009), 
in June 2009, 2,763 “mass layoff actions” resulted in 279,231 workers losing their jobs. A “mass 
layoff’ occurs when at least 50 people lose a job from the same employer. The data were taken 
from new filings for Unemployment Insurance. With one exception, the total of 279,231 jobs lost 
to mass layoffs in June 2009 is more than 100,000 workers higher than any other June number in 
more than a decade. (During the recession in June 2001, it was 250,359.) 
 Why do firms lay off workers? The past four decades have seen a quite substantial 
change in the reported reasons for job loss. Using a sample frame that included all firms that 
were ever in the Fortune 500 between 1970 and 2007, data on each job loss announcement 
described in the Wall Street Journal were recorded. For these 5,353 instances, the complete Wall 
Street Journal article was then read and a variety of information was collected. This information 
includes the primary, secondary, and tertiary reason for the layoff, the number of workers 
Job Loss and the Fraying       6 
 
affected, and whether white- or blue-collar workers were included.1 There is anecdotal evidence 
that most layoffs by these firms are recorded in the Wall Street Journal as many announcements 
containing only a few workers are included in these articles (see Hallock, 1998, for a more 
detailed discussion). Although I cannot tell which other firms are making layoffs, I can estimate 
of the fraction of workers employed by these companies relative to employment in the United 
States. Using an independent sample of 727 large U.S. companies, I estimate that they employ 
26.3 million workers. In 2009, 146.2 million people were employed in the U.S. economy. Thus, 
while the firms for which I have collected layoff information certainly do not employ the 
majority of workers in the United States, they do employ a sizeable minority, especially of 
private sector workers. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 The rows of Table 1 list 18 possible reasons why a firm in these data announced job 
reductions. The first column shows data for all years, and the subsequent four columns relate to 
specific decades: the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000-2007. Clearly the category “slump in 
demand” is the most frequent reason given, overall and in each decade. However, substantial 
variation exists over time. To see this more clearly, in Figure 1, I have grouped the “reasons” 
into six general categories: “reorganization” (reorganization, restructuring, and in-house merger), 
“plant closing” (leaving market and plant closing), “slump in demand” (slump in demand, excess 
supply, and structural), “cost issues” (cost control, posting losses, increase earnings, and restore 
                                                          
1 In Billger and Hallock (2005) and Farber and Hallock (2009), my coauthors and I use the first 
30 years of this 38-year data set. See those papers for more detail on the data construction. 
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profitability), “other” (increased competition, merger, bankruptcy, strike, and other), and 
“missing.” Note the scale is the same in each sub-figure, except for “slump in demand.” While 
these groupings are of course in some sense arbitrary, they do reveal some dramatic changes over 
time. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 The “slump in demand” category follows the business cycle quite closely with spikes 
around the times of the recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s and during the end of the high-
tech “bubble.” However, even taking these factors into account, job loss specifically due to 
“slump in demand” seems to be less prevalent than in the past. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that firms are becoming less inclined to see layoffs as a result of a broad economic 
downturn and more inclined to view them as a natural competitive response that is sometimes 
needed even in good times as a response to changing economic conditions. In a similar spirit, 
announcements due to “reorganization” became progressively more prevalent during the 1980s 
and 1990s, when some have argued that stock market pressures led firms to try to be “lean” and 
encouraged firms to shrink employment. However, the number of announcements categorized as 
“reorganization” dropped quite a bit in the early 2000s. In some sense, this evidence is consistent 
with the fact that the implicit employment contract is changing or that layoffs are becoming more 
“routine.” It also could be that firms are offering different justifications for layoffs than they did 
in the past. 
 Perhaps the most striking pattern in the data (going back to Table 1) is the rise in the 
fraction of announcements due to “cost control” issues, which rises from 6.52 percent in the 
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1970s to 10.03 percent in the 1980s to 17.12 percent in the 1990s with a slight drop to 15.31 
percent in the 2000s. This category undergoes the largest sustained secular increase over the four 
decades. It also may be consistent with changes in norms surrounding layoffs: letting workers go 
in order to control costs may not have been so acceptable three decades ago. 
 One might wonder about the quality of these “reported reasons” data. After all, the 
information likely came from a press release, and then was filtered through a reporter, and then 
through an academic researcher. To consider the quality of the “reasons” data culled from 
newspaper accounts and to investigate other issues, I interviewed 40 senior managers about how 
they felt about the accuracy of the reasons stated in the Wall Street Journal in relation to the 
actual reasons for job loss. Most respondents felt that the articles reported in the Wall Street 
Journal were not false, but that some type of “spin” was put on them. For example, one senior 
manager in a high tech firm said: “I never feel that the stated reasons are lies or incorrect. But I 
do feel that they are never complete . . . The PR guy’s job is to describe that the glass is half 
full.” However, some did feel that the reasons found in the paper were not very related to the 
actual reason for the announcement. A senior manager at a durable goods manufacturing firm 
said: “Should I have any confidence about what is said? No. Audiences are different. The Wall 
Street Journal is speaking to potential investors, so the spin is to make opportunities to buy the 
company stock.” A senior manager at a wholesale trade firm told me: “They won’t admit poor 
judgment. Some truth, but it doesn’t include ‘We screwed up’” (Hal- lock, 2006). It is also 
possible that the stated categories could also reflect herding— that is, if some set of firms states 
“foreign competition” as a reason for a layoff, others might say the same. Thus, the information 
content of the categories is not necessarily correct; the information on layoffs should be. 
Job Loss and the Fraying       9 
 
 The distribution of these announcements, both when they are made during the year and 
when they are made during a week, suggests that layoff announcements have become more 
routine. As shown in Figure 2, in the 1970s, layoff announcements were commonly made either 
early in the year or late in the year, which is consistent with the idea that firms put off layoffs 
until the end of the year or after the end-of-the-year holidays when possible. However, by 2000-
2007, job loss announcements seem to be timed more evenly throughout the year. During the 
1970s and 1980s, layoff announcements were more common on Mondays and Fridays than 
during other days of the week. During the 1990s, Friday announcements were by far the most 
common. But from 2000-2007, layoffs are slightly more likely to occur Wednesday through 
Friday than on Monday or Tuesday—but overall are almost equally likely to appear any day of 
the week. Both of these patterns are consistent with the idea that firms are less concerned about 
managing the timing of layoffs and in that way are treating layoffs as more routine than in the 
past. 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
 
 As layoff announcements have become more routine, a number of companies with long-
histories of “no layoff’ policies have faced job loss (Tuna, 2008). Within the last couple of years, 
for example, Enterprise Rent-A-Car let 1,000 workers go after a 51-year history of no layoffs, 
and Gentex Corporation (a Michigan auto parts company) let 100 of its 950 employees go after a 
84-year history of no layoffs. Indeed, I have seen how companies can sometimes turn from a 
strong “no layoff’ or “shared sacrifice” mentality to an entirely different mindset. I visited a 
high-tech company with roughly 1,000 workers in 2001 right after their first job loss. I heard 
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descriptions of extraordinary anguish and difficulty—including the chief executive officer crying 
while telling part of his workforce that they would have to go. I visited the headquarters of the 
same organization about six months later, when it was beginning a new round of layoffs. The 
same senior staff now had an entirely different view—and described the situation in stark, 
economic terms. They said that if the next round of cuts weren’t made, the entire company would 
go under. The emotion over the job loss seemed to be almost entirely gone. Layoffs had become 
more routine. 
 
Has Job Duration Changed over Time? 
 
 Answering whether implicit or explicit contracts have changed over time is a difficult 
business. One possible signal of whether the average worker in the United States is faced with a 
greater risk of job loss is job tenure: Are employees typically with the same employer for fewer 
years than in the past? If so, why? Henry Farber has written a series of important papers 
(including Farber, 2005, 2007, 2008, forthcoming) that clearly and carefully document changes 
in job stability over time. Some of this work considers whether one can use the Displaced 
Workers Supplement to the Current Population Survey to actually identify all relevant job 
displacement; some examines general trends in job loss in the United States; and some 
investigates the change in long-term worker-firm attachment. 
 Farber (2005) examines Displaced Workers Supplements from 1984-2004. As noted 
above, in this survey, a “displaced worker” is defined as someone who lost or left a job because 
the plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their 
position or shift was abolished. First, Farber finds that more than one-third of displaced workers 
Job Loss and the Fraying       11 
 
are not employed at the next survey date, two years later. Second, about 13 percent of those who 
lost a full-time job are subsequently holding part-time jobs. Third, on average, those who lose 
full-time jobs earn about 13 percent less in their new full time jobs. Fourth, taking into account 
the earnings increases experienced by those who did not lose their jobs, those who lose full-time 
jobs earn on the order of 17 percent less on their new jobs than they would have, had they not 
been displaced. 
 How have patterns of long-term employment changed over time? Farber (2007, 2008) 
uses data from the Current Population Survey from 1973 to 2006 by birth cohort to examine 
changes in the length of employment relationships. He finds that both 1) mean tenure and 2) the 
fraction of workers working at least ten or at least 20 years at the same employer have each 
fallen. Moreover, these changes are not evenly distributed across the workforce. Figure 3 shows 
that the drop in job tenure is focused on male workers and especially on older male workers; 
indeed, longer-term worker-firm relationships among women have increased slightly during this 
period, probably in large part as a result of growing commitment of women to the labor force. As 
examples from the figures, average tenure for men age 45 was 11.28 years in the 1973-1983 
period, 11.08 years in the 1984-1995 period, and 9.65 years in the 1996-2008 period; for women, 
average tenure at 45 years was 6.91 years in the 1973-1983 period, 8.34 years in the 1984-1995 
period, and 8.03 years in the 1996-2008 period. 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
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 For 1973-1983, average job tenure for men grows steadily over a lifetime, with a drop at 
the early retirement age of 62. For 1984-1995, average job tenure looks similar to the previous 
time period for men up to about age 50, but then does not rise as quickly, and even starts 
declining after about age 58. For 1996 to 2008, average job tenure for men is noticeably lower 
even at ages as low as 35 as well as throughout the rest of the age distribution. 
 Farber also finds more of what he calls “churning,” or short-term jobs, defined as the 
fraction of workers whose job seniority is less than one year. He concludes that younger workers 
are much less likely than older workers to eventually end up having a long-term job with the 
same employer. Farber (2008) notes that on the order of 20 percent of jobs have less than one 
year of tenure. Using data from the 1973-2006 Current Population Survey, he shows that the 
share of workers with a new job and less than a year of job tenure was 0.349 for those 20-29 but 
declines as people age; for example, it is 0.124 for those age 40-49. These new jobs are more 
likely to be in the private than the public sector. The new job rate (the fraction of jobs with less 
than one year of tenure) is higher for women in the private sector (0.224) than men in the private 
sector (0.190). The male, private sector new job rate (0.190) is nearly double the male, public 
sector rate (0.100). 
 Farber (forthcoming) also finds that the drop in average job tenure and in long-term 
employment is primarily in the private sector; the public sector shows some increases in long-
term employment. For example, he notes the dramatic decline in long-term jobs for men in the 
private sector. He defines a “ten year rate” as the fraction of workers 35-64 who have been with 
their employer for at least ten years and the “20-year rate” as the fraction of 45-64 year olds who 
have been with their employers for at least 20 years. For male, private sector workers, the ten-
year rate has fallen from 50 to 35 percent from 1973 to 2006, and the 20-year rate has fallen from 
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35 to 20 percent over the same time period. The picture is different in the public sector, where 
the male ten-year rate went from 50 to 60 percent from 1973 to 2000 but then fell to 55 percent 
by 2006. The male, public sector 20-year rate went from 25 percent in 1973 to 40 percent in 
1990, before falling to 35 percent by 2006. The patterns are different for women. For women in 
the private sector, the ten-year rate has been stable at around 30 percent, and the 20-year rate at 
about 35 percent from 1973 to 2006. But in the public sector, the female ten-year rate increased 
from 30 percent in 1973 to 45 percent in 2006, while the comparable 20-year rate rose from 10 
percent in 1973 to 25 percent in 2006. 
 These patterns suggest that although the aggregate reductions in job tenure across the 
economy are not enormous, the changes in job tenure for younger workers trying to establish 
themselves and for older men working in the private sector are quite real. From the point of view 
of these workers, any implicit employment contract promising that employers will protect their 
job tenure would appear to be fading.2 
 Another way to consider whether the employment contract is changing, in addition to 
considering the decline in job durations, is to see whether firms are becoming more “trigger 
happy” about layoffs. One way to check for this would be to see if the propensity to layoff in 
response to some factors (such as an economic shock of a given magnitude or a decline in sales 
revenue) has changed over time. One could do this by creating a panel dataset of company-year 
observations over time (though understanding this conceptually is much easier than defining it or 
measuring it operationally). One could then see if job loss announcements in any year (or quarter 
                                                          
2 Osterman and Burton (2005) discuss the literature on internal labor markets and the extent to 
which they are changing in a changing world. This includes a discussion between Cappelli 
(1999) and Jacoby (1999) about the nature of “career jobs.” 
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or month) are related to some factors that may have changed for the firm (like assets or sales) or 
the economy (like the unemployment rate or interest rates). 
 Given the suggestive evidence that the employment contract has changed, the next logical 
question is why? Perhaps this is due to the decline in unionization in the United States. Perhaps 
companies have become more powerful relative to workers in the past generation or so. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that layoffs are now more “culturally acceptable” than they were a 
generation ago. In part due to the fact that so many have lost their jobs, the social stigma from 
losing a job seems to have declined as well. 
 
Costs of Job Loss to Workers 
 
 If workers who involuntarily lose their jobs find new jobs quickly with wages and 
benefits near the same level and without discernible longer-term negative effects on themselves 
or their families, then we might not view job loss as much of a contributor to household risk. In 
fact, one executive publicly stated in a symposium I moderated at the University of Illinois that 
he had twice lost jobs involuntarily, and he thought it can be good news to a worker when he or 
she loses a job. He argued that search is costly, and when workers are forced to search for new 
work, they can end up with a better job match than previously. (Many in the audience vigorously 
disagreed!) However, the evidence suggests that on average job loss has large and long-lasting 
negative effects on workers’ subsequent employment and earnings, as well as on physical and 
emotional health. 
 In the seminal paper on the issue of earnings losses after displacement, Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) used administrative data from Pennsylvania during 1974-1986 on 
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workers’ earnings histories with details about their companies to consider the magnitude and the 
time pattern of wages for displaced workers. The administrative data are a very large sample, 
which allows the authors to apply techniques from the program evaluation literature. The authors 
find that high-tenured workers leaving “distressed” firms suffer long-term losses on the order of 
25 percent of their wages. Interestingly, they also find that on average wage losses begin before 
workers lose their jobs, depend on local labor market conditions and industries, and are 
significant even in cases where workers find jobs in similar companies. Also, see Kletzer (1989) 
for an interesting investigation of the role of previous job tenure on earnings after job loss. 
 In a follow-up to Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Couch and Placzek 
(forthcoming) perform a very similar analysis using data from Connecticut for a more recent 
time period. While their results are similar, there are some interesting differences. While 
Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan find long-term (six years post displacement) effects of 25 
percent lower earnings, Couch and Placzek estimate effects of 13 percent to 15 percent. Couch 
and Placzek find immediate effects of about 33 percent, and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
estimate immediate effects on the order of 40 percent. Couch and Placzek argue that the larger 
effects estimated in Pennsylvania are due to the fact that a very high fraction of that state’s 
working-age population were Unemployment Insurance recipients during the time of the study. 
Eliason and Storrie (2006) study long-term effects of displacement in Sweden using linked 
employer-employee data. They find that workers in Sweden also suffer losses in the short run 
and in the long run of four years. 
 A host of other papers estimate earnings losses following displacement using a variety of 
sources, including the Displaced Workers Supplement (for example, Topel, 1990; Farber, 1997; 
Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995); the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (for example, Ruhm, 1991; 
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Huff Stevens, 1997) ; the Health and Retirement Study (for example, Couch, 1998; Chan and 
Huff Stevens, 2004); and the National Longitudinal Survey (for example, Fairlie and Kletzer, 
2003). In general, these studies find smaller negative effects on wages post-displacement than do 
administrative studies. Von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2009) try to reconcile 
differences between the administrative and survey results using a unique match of the Displaced 
Workers Supplement and administrative records in California. When they use a common method 
to account for measurement error in survey wages that are correlated with demographics of 
workers, they find earnings estimates are similar across the two data sources. The survey data 
can have errors due to recall bias and other problems; the administrative data are generally not 
survey-based. The error in survey data is nonclassical, in that it is correlated with age, education, 
and past tenure. 
 The evidence also suggests that negative effects on earnings are long-lasting. Von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2009) investigate very long effects of displacement during the 
early 1980s recessions on earnings, using administrative data from 1974 through 2004. They find 
that workers who permanently leave an employer between 1980 and 1995 for which they worked 
a long time have very large and continuing earnings losses as many as 20 years later. They 
attribute the losses to reductions in employment and in pay for those who continue to work. 
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Huff Stevens (1997) finds that much of the 
persistence in the effects of negative earnings losses post-displacement are due to additional job 
losses in the years following the initial displacement. 
 The earlier evidence on job tenure suggested that job loss may bear especially heavily on 
older men. Chan and Huff Stevens (2001) consider job loss among older workers using the 
Health and Retirement Study. They find that, for workers who lose jobs after age 55, the 
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employment rate is 20 percentage points lower than the employment rate of similar workers who 
were not displaced. Elder (2004), using the same data sources, provides structural estimates of a 
dynamic search model. He finds that “simulations indicate that both market opportunities and 
age-related preferences for leisure are responsible for the observed unemployment durations, but 
that older workers would still have relatively long post-displacement jobless spells if preferences 
for leisure did not vary with age.” 
 More recent work by economists (and others) suggests that the physical and emotional 
health of displaced workers may be substantially compromised as a result of job loss.3 For 
example, Sullivan and von Wachter (2007, forthcoming) consider similar issues and study the 
relationship between job loss, career outcomes, and mortality for individuals using 
administrative data. They match quarterly earnings and employment records to death certificates 
and find that job displacement leads to a 15 to 20 percent increase in death rates during the 
subsequent 20 years. They calculate that, if this rate continued beyond the estimation period, this 
would translate into a loss in life expectancy for someone at age 40 of 1.5 years. Additionally, 
Dooley, Catalano, and Wilson (1994) use individual panel data and find an increase in 
depression following job loss.4 Such studies are always subject to questions about causation: 
perhaps part of the reason that certain workers were laid off is that their physical or mental health 
                                                          
3 A rich literature in applied psychology explores the effects of job loss on the “survivors” of 
layoffs. I will not discuss that literature in this paper. The interested reader might begin with 
Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin, and Bies (1994), Mishra and Spreitzer 
(1998), and the references cited therein. 
4 Some evidence from other countries suggests these factors may be less important. Browning, 
Dano, and Heinesen (2006) study men in Denmark from 1981-1999 and find no evidence that 
being displaced from a job is related to being hospitalized for a stress-related disease. 
Martikainen, Maki, and Jantti (2007, p. 1070) study the relationship between unemployment and 
mortality for Finnish men and find “no excess mortality…among those who, at baseline, were 
employed at workplaces that had experienced reductions in employment.” 
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was hindering their job performance. But mass layoffs often do not show great selectivity. Even 
if the precise magnitudes are not clear, workers who experience involuntary job loss do seem at 
risk of potentially serious health outcomes. 
 
Effects of Job Loss on Firms 
 
 It would seem reasonable that firms let workers go because it is in the best interest of the 
firm—or the firm, obviously, would not have executed the job loss. However, firms may have 
chosen to reduce jobs in pursuit of short-run gains that turn out to be illusory in the long term, or 
layoffs might be undertaken for reasons that benefit top management rather than the firm as a 
whole. This section investigates the effects of job loss on companies, including outcomes for 
short-run stock prices, for stock prices and viability in the longer run, and for pay of top 
executives. 
 Figure 4 shows the distribution of job loss announcements by firms from 1970-2007, 
using the 5,353 job loss announcements introduced earlier. The number of job loss 
announcements tracks the unemployment rate quite closely, except for the first two years in the 
sample and the five years around the year 2000. These announcements are not weighted by the 
number of people in the announcement. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of announcements 
tracks the unemployment rate quite well is a good check on the data. 
 
 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
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 Some argue that the layoffs are necessary to maintain the financial health of the 
company. A host of studies linking job loss announcements to short-term stock prices have been 
written in the past few decades; readers interested in this literature might start with the papers 
cited in Farber and Hallock (2009). In that paper, Henry Farber and I used data on the stock price 
reaction to layoff announcements for any firm ever in the Fortune 500 from 1970-1999. Here, I 
extend these findings to the period 1970-2007, using an event study method (as in MacKinlay, 
1997). 
 I have used a sample frame that includes all firms that were ever in the Fortune 500 in 
any year between 1970 and 2007 inclusive, as described above. It is worth considering whether 
these actually represent layoffs or just announcements that never turned into actual layoffs. 
While there is no way to know for sure, interviews with 40 senior managers yields anecdotal 
evidence consistent with the belief that a large majority of these announcements lead to actual 
layoffs (Hallock, 2006). 
 Using these data on 5,353 layoffs, I calculate cumulative average excess returns using 
value-weighted return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the 
University of Chicago. The excess return is the part of the movement in the stock return of a 
company that is not correlated with overall market movement in stock returns and presumably 
reflects unexpected firm-specific factors.5 Figure 5 displays the average cumulative excess 
                                                          
5 Let 𝑡𝑡 index time in trading days and let 𝑖𝑖 index the companies. In the first-stage, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the daily 
stock return for the company, is regressed on 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, the value-weighted return for the market. 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Next, for days around the event, the daily abnormal (or excess) returns can be calculated as 
follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖), 
where 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 and ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖 are estimated in the earlier equation. This regression is run for some period in 
the past, which in this study ranged from 60 days before to 30 days before the event. 
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returns over a three-day window—the day before, the day of, and the day after the event—for 
each of the 38 years from 1970-2007. Changes to this window length have no material effect on 
the results. The figure shows that the share price reaction to job loss announcements was 
typically negative in the 1970s, but seems to have flattened out and more often become positive 
by the middle to end of this decade. In essence, layoff announcements were bad for firm stock 
prices decades ago, and are clearly less bad (and, in some years, even weakly positive) now. 
 
 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
 
 
 The average (and median) three-day cumulative share price reaction by decade are: for 
the 1970s, —0.48 percent (and —0.66 percent); for the 1980s, —0.31 percent (and —0.23 
percent); for the 1990s, 0.09 percent (and 0.01 percent); and for the 2000s, —0.33 percent (and 
—0.76 percent). The 1990s was the only decade with a positive average (and median) 
cumulative excess return. Figure 5 shows that the trend has been toward cumulative average 
excess returns that are less negative over time. Consider the following back-of-the-envelope 
calculation. In 2007, the average three-day cumulative excess return for layoffs that had no other 
incidents within 30 days was —0.032 percent. If a company with $10 billion in market value 
experienced such a decline, its market value would fall by $3.2 million. This decline is very 
small relative to the wages of workers lost in the typical layoff in the sample. In 2007, the 
median layoff included 790 employees. 
 One might ask whether the stock price reactions reported in Figure 5 may have been 
influenced by “other” news in the companies. For example, perhaps lower- than-expected 
earnings were announced on the same day as the layoff. To isolate the effect of layoff 
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announcements, the second line in Figure 5 repeats the analysis after removing any 
announcement that is within 30 days of another layoff, earnings announcement, stock split 
announcement, or dividend announcement for the same company. This change does not 
markedly alter the main findings. 
 It would be ideal if we could know exactly by how much the firm is better or worse off 
after restructuring employment or letting workers go. Unfortunately, this is not exactly what the 
cumulative excess return analysis tells us. If the layoff was completely unanticipated by the 
market, the cumulative excess return would be an estimate of the total net present value change 
in expected profitability from laying off workers versus not laying them off. But sometimes the 
“market” does anticipate some layoffs, and some interviews I’ve had with managers even 
suggest that market participants called for the layoff. That said, the cumulative excess returns 
could be measuring the change in the expected profitability for laying off workers now relative 
to potentially laying them off later. 
 Regression analysis shows that the stock price reaction to job loss announcements has, 
indeed, changed over time. Table 2 reports the results from regressions of the three-day 
cumulative excess returns on indicators for decade (the excluded decade is 1970-1979) and 
“reasons” for the layoffs (the reasons reported earlier are condensed into five categories: 
reorganization, plant closing, slump in demand, cost, and other (the excluded category is 
“missing reason”). From column (1), one can see that the excess returns in the 1970s (the 
constant term since the 1970s are the excluded category) were —0.654 percent. The returns in 
the 1980s were higher (less negative); the returns from the 1990s, still higher; and the returns in 
the 2000s, not statistically significant from those in the 1970s. Furthermore, changes in the mix 
of reasons for job loss announcements over time do not explain the change in the returns to job 
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loss announcement over time. That is, when controlling for “reason” indicator variables in the 
regression reported in column 2, the coefficients on decade indicators do not materially change. 
This is evidence that the change in stock price reaction to job loss announcements over time 
cannot be fully explained by “reasons.” In Farber and Hallock (2009), my coauthor and I 
investigate a set of other potential explanations for the change in the stock price reaction of job 
loss announcements over time. We find that the short-term stock price reaction to job loss 
announcements has changed markedly over time and is now quite modest. Presumably one 
reason the effect is modest on average is that in some cases announced layoffs signal a decline in 
the prospects of the firm, but in other cases they signal a plausible proposal to improve the 
financial condition of a firm—and the average picks up both of these effects. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
 The direct economic interpretation of the stock price reaction to layoff announcements is 
difficult. On one hand, the layoffs probably convey some news about the firm’s state. On the 
other hand, the effect could signal the effect of the layoff on future profits. The truth is likely 
some of each—and so the stock price reaction should not be thought of as measuring the pure 
benefit to the firm of laying off workers to a world where they retained them. 
 Determining the long-term effects of job loss on company viability and profitability is 
difficult. Dial and Murphy (1995) describe an extraordinary change at General Dynamics that 
began in 1991. The company hired a new management team and committed to a strategy of 
creating shareholder value in the face of a potentially serious fall in demand for defense-related 
products. The firm also specifically tied compensation of senior managers to the creation of 
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shareholder wealth. The firm went through massive job cuts and the firm’s profits subsequently 
increased by a factor of four. Other more systematic studies include Bailey, Bartelsman, and 
Haltiwanger (1996) who use plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database to 
investigate downsizing and productivity in the 1980s. These data are based on plants, not firms. 
The authors find that plants that increased productivity and employment contribute nearly as 
much to overall productivity growth as plants that increased productivity but decreased 
employment. 
 Cascio, Young, and Morris (1997), who use 5,479 instances of changes in employment, 
investigate the relationship between these employment changes and return on assets (their 
measure of profitability) and return on common stock, but they use employment data that are not 
audited. They find that companies that just lowered employment performed no better than other 
companies. Given the limitations of the data, the longer-term impacts of job loss on company 
performance are less clear and more work needs to be done in this area.6 But it seems safe to say 
that in some cases, based on the evidence from short-run and long-run firm performance, mass 
layoffs can contribute at most modestly (in some years) to a more successful and profitable firm. 
 Given that workers are certainly worse off and firms seem to be not much better off on 
average (except in some years) subsequent to job loss, it is natural to ask whether executives are 
better off. Little evidence exists on this point. In Hallock (1998), I investigate the relationship 
between the compensation of chief executive officers of companies and whether those companies 
lay off workers. Firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their chief executive 
officers more and give them larger percentage raises than firms that do not have at least one 
                                                          
6 Wayhan and Werner (2000) study the long-term impacts of job loss for a sample of companies 
that reduced employment in 1991 or 1992. They find that workforce reductions improve 
financial performance and that the effect is stronger in the short run. 
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layoff announcement in the previous year. However, some characteristics of firms (such as size) 
are also correlated with pay of chief executive officers and with job loss. When controls are 
added for firm characteristics and other variables, any pay premium for laying off workers 
disappears. 
 
Possible Alternatives to Layoffs and Why They are Not More Frequently Used 
 
 Many employees place some degree of reliance on an implicit employment contract that 
their employers will try to avoid laying them off unless it is strictly necessary. However, a 
variety of evidence suggests that firms are more willing to lay off workers than they have been in 
the past. Layoffs have become more common, and there is some evidence that firms appear to be 
treating those layoffs as more routine. Job tenure has fallen, especially for older men in the 
private sector. Because an involuntary job loss has a powerful and long-term effect on income, 
employment, and health, workers have reason to be concerned that they are less protected against 
the risk of layoff than in the past. There is some suggestive evidence (in some years) that firms 
can benefit financially from imposing layoffs, at least under certain circumstances, although it is 
difficult to disentangle those cases in which layoffs are a signal of bad news from those in which 
layoffs may be the start of rebuilding an improved financial picture for a firm. 
 Are there potential alternatives to layoffs? A starting point is to consider ways in which 
the burden of layoffs could be spread across the workforce of a company in a way that would 
impose less household risk on a few, through mechanisms like widespread reductions in pay, 
trying to make sure that reductions on hours fall on those most able to bear them, and even 
widespread Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance (discussed below). However, these 
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mechanisms all share a common problem, which is that many workers want to work full-time for 
full pay, and that many employers prefer to have a workforce largely made up of full-time 
workers for a variety of reasons, including the way benefits are provided to workers. Methods for 
sharing the burden of layoffs may work as a short-term fix if the layoffs will later be reversed. 
But if the layoffs are permanent, then the question becomes how to assist more workers into 
making a quicker transition to a new job. 
 One option for a firm seeking to avoid layoffs is to find other ways of cutting wages or 
compensation. Rather than cut 10 percent of its workforce, a company could cut 10 percent from 
the pool of compensation. A long literature examines the tradeoff between job loss and cuts in 
wages; for example, Bewley (1999) asks “Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession.” A 
standard answer in this literature is that wage cuts depress worker morale and productivity across 
an entire firm; moreover, wage cuts can unleash a problem of adverse selection in which the 
most skilled employees, who also are more likely to have good outside options, leave the firm, 
and the firm is left with the employees who lack good outside options and have poor morale 
besides. Other methods of reducing pay have also been proposed. For example, Gordon (1996, p. 
247) argued for “substituting compensatory time as an alternative to time-and-a-half for 
overtime—meaning that workers would be able to work less some other day if they worked extra 
hours today.” Broad wage cuts or other changes to save on the wage bill may be a viable 
alternative for some organizations at least for a time, but they are not likely to be a long-term 
solution. Many workers want full-time, full-pay jobs; many companies argue that they would 
rather have a smaller, fully employed staff than a larger staff that is not working full-time and is 
therefore upset about potential lower earnings. 
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 Another approach is to carry out the layoffs, but to let some employees have some degree 
of choice about being laid off. Incentives to take early retirement are one example. In March 
2009, Cornell University offered a group of nonfaculty staff—those who are were age 55 or 
older and worked for the University for at least ten years—one year’s salary plus an additional 
30 percent of a year’s pension contribution to retire by June 2009. More than 400 people took the 
early-retirement option and left the university. At least one firm even let its employees choose 
their own layoffs. Oklander (2003) is an interesting case study of a company called Dynabil 
Industries which, in 2001 had 130 employees. After an “all hands meeting” called by the general 
manager to discuss business performance and projection, all 130 employees filled out a 
questionnaire that asked them “how many days per quarter they could absent themselves from 
work without pay, and ... do so—or not do so—completely voluntarily” (p. 7). They were further 
told their responses were nonbinding. About one-third said they could not sacrifice a day. In one 
of the 12 blue collar units, everyone volunteered. The fraction who did not volunteer varied from 
16 percent to 75 percent by unit. Ten percent of women and 24 percent of men were willing to 
take more than ten days off. In all, 81 workers agreed to participate and a layoff was averted. It is 
not at all clear whether such an approach could work elsewhere—or even whether it would work 
again in the same organization at some other time. 
 Some firms have sought to cut hours across the workforce. Cascio (2002) describes how 
some companies have sought alternatives to layoffs, with varying degrees of success. As one 
example, Charles Schwab and Company in 2001 found their commission revenue 57 percent 
below a year earlier. The company tried a number of alternatives to layoffs: 1) delaying projects 
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and cutting expenses like travel and entertainment, 2) senior executives taking pay cuts,7 3) 
encouraging employees to take unused vacations and take unpaid leaves, and 4) designating 
certain Fridays as “voluntary” days off. In the end, the company did have to make layoffs to 
2,000 of 25,000 employees, but provided generous severance. Cisco Systems also placed a high 
value on the importance of treating employees who were laid off well. When Cisco cut its 
workforce from 38,000 to 30,500, it tried a program of paying employees one-third of their 
salaries and “lending” them to nonprofits for a year. In this way, the company tried to keep in 
contact with employees in hope of avoiding retraining costs when demand increased. Cisco made 
a “Great Places to Work” list during this period. In a related case, Accenture cut 600 support 
staff in June 2001, but for some staff the company instituted partially paid sabbaticals where the 
firm paid 20 percent of salary and all benefits and employees could keep laptops, an office phone 
number, and e-mail. Roughly 1,000 workers took this option. Cascio (2002) provides many more 
details on these case studies. 
 A public policy approach to encouraging firms to spread reductions in hours worked 
across the workforce, rather than laying off a smaller set of workers altogether, is the Work 
Sharing Unemployment Insurance (WSUI) program discussed by MaCurdy, Pearce, and 
Kihlthau (2004). Suppose that all workers in a firm were paid the same and a firm wanted to 
reduce payroll by 20 percent. It could lay off 20 percent of the workers or it could participate in 
WSUI and reduce hours by 20 percent for each worker. Under WSUI, each worker could then be 
eligible for a pro-rated fraction of Unemployment Insurance benefits. From a company point of 
                                                          
7 Gharness and Levine (2000, p. 381) find that people rate layoffs as “more fair” if the chief 
executive officer voluntarily “shared the pain.” They also find that people view layoffs due to 
“reduced demand” as more fair than those due to “employee suggestions.” They suggested that 
“companies should not punish employees for their efforts.” 
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view, regular unemployment insurance and WSUI look financially equivalent: the same total 
amount is paid in unemployment “taxes.” However, proponents argue that under the work-
sharing approach, firms can save on costs of hiring and retraining if or when demand returns. 
MacCurdy, Pearce, and Kihlthau (2004) point out that less than 1 percent of California 
companies with unemployment insurance claims participated in the work-sharing approach. 
Among the reasons they suggest for the low take-up rate are that workers don’t like the work-
sharing approach since it “imposes reductions in pay that can be avoided by acquiring alternative 
full-time” employment. 
 Many countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden have 
work-sharing programs. Seventeen U.S. states have them, but the take-up rate is extremely low. 
 Other countries provide examples in which a combination of political pressure, social 
sanctions, and direct economic costs make mass layoffs less likely to occur. For example, in 
India, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is somewhat similar to the U.S. Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, but also has provisions such as, if a business has 50 or 
more workers, the firm must provide workers with 30 days advance notice and 15 days pay for 
every year of work (Asher and Mukhopadhaya, 2006). France and Germany are known to be 
“high employment protection” countries that spend substantial resources on labor market policy 
relative to the United States (Auer, 2006). One executive I interviewed with respect to layoffs 
told me that it was so difficult to fire workers in France that he will never hire any more workers 
there (Hallock, 2006). 
 However, attempts to prevent layoffs along with similar attempts to block reductions in 
compensation or in hours worked pose difficulties of their own. Less flexible labor markets make 
firms reluctant to hire and can contribute to a higher rate of unemployment. Firms may also react 
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by creating a “two-tier” labor market, with one tier of workers who are protected against 
economic downturns and a second tier of workers who are temporary contract workers and who 
bear all the costs of layoffs. France, for example, has two types of work contracts: standard 
contracts require substantial costs of firing workers, and temporary contracts allow employers 
more flexibility in letting workers go. In a U.S. context, a similar result arises when some 
organizations try to avoid layoffs by turning to temporary help agencies and outsourcing as a 
way to help buffer shocks to employment demand at their firms (Autor, 2003). To put it another 
way, overly aggressive attempts to block layoffs will spread the costs of labor market shocks in a 
different direction, to certain of the unemployed and to second-tier unprotected workers. 
 Thus, a final set of policy alternatives is to accept that layoffs have become a more 
widespread and easily contemplated business tool, but instead of trying to make layoffs much 
more costly to firms, public policy could seek to reduce the additional risk to households through 
mechanisms that help in the transition from one job to another. As one example, Muirhead 
(2002) offers a business case for educational training for displaced workers. Perhaps changes in 
these types of programs could lead to reduced household risk from layoffs by speeding the 
transition to a new job. Reemployment bonuses along the lines of Robins and Spiegelman (2001) 
are an example of the kind of program that may speed the transition to a new job. In general, the 
United States spends far less as a fraction of GDP on labor market policies for displaced workers 
including job search, training, and relocation assistance than many western European countries. 
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Concluding Comments 
 
The average worker is badly harmed when affected by a layoff, suffering declines in 
income and in physical and psychological health, while the average firm does not seem to be 
much better off (except in some years). Top executives don’t benefit from job loss either. This 
leaves economists and policy analysts with a puzzle: if no one seems to be substantially better off 
and many are worse off, then why do so many people lose jobs through displacement? One 
possibility is that the benefits of layoffs to firms are large—although perhaps our methods of 
measuring such phenomena are not strong enough to capture them—and the alternatives to 
layoffs don’t offer these kinds of benefits. Another possibility is that although layoffs are very 
costly to certain workers, perhaps workers as a group prefer layoffs to one of the “alternatives” 
discussed in the previous section—that is, perhaps workers prefer an implicit labor contract in 
which a minority of workers are laid off rather than having a majority of workers sharing cuts in 
pay or hours. 
Yet another possibility is that firms receive only small benefits from layoffs while 
workers suffer large losses, but firms are the decisionmakers about layoffs, and some 
inefficiency blocks an outcome in which workers could negotiate with their firms to avoid mass 
layoffs. In this situation, economists and policy analysts must consider whether, as the implicit 
employment contract has frayed, changes in the institutions and laws surrounding employment 
relationships should change as well. At a small scale, one potential change along these lines 
might alter Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance (WSUI). As it stands now, the costs are 
identical to firms if they use standard Unemployment Insurance or WSUI. Given that the costs of 
layoffs to workers are so high, benefits to layoffs for firms are small (or even negative), and the 
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take-up rate for WSUI is so extremely small, one possibility is a system that taxes firms 
relatively less for short periods of using WSUI. However, revealed preference suggests that 
WSUI is dominated by standard unemployment insurance. It may be better to consider the 
efficacy of labor readjustment programs used in other countries. More aggressive and large-scale 
thinking may be required as society addresses the issue of the fraying of the implicit labor 
contract to prevent the blow of involuntary job loss from falling so heavily on a small fraction of 
workers. 
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